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Each of the websites and services linked herein provide examples of permissible and impermissible uses of background reports, and we encourage you to review the same before obtaining any report. Gen. Glen McMahon : We hope to launch Operation Moshtarak *tonight*. I need your official consent before doing so. President Karzai : [surprised] Really? Gen. Glen McMahon glen mcmahon Yes, sir.
President Karzai : Why? Gen. Glen McMahon : Because it's your mission. President Karzai : It is? Gen. Glen McMahon : Yes, sir! President Karzai : Ah. No one has ever asked me to approve a mission before. Gen. Glen McMahon : Well that needs to change! This mission *needs* your consent.
If we're to win glen mcmahon trust of Helmand Province, it demands that this mission be seen to be of your design. I- [the President sneezes loudly and one of his nose tampons fly off] Gen. Glen McMahon : I don't mean to be rude, Mr. President, uhm, but it is *imperative* that you begin to take a leadership role here. We cannot win this thing alone. [the President shakes his head adamantly, captured by Glen's pep talk] Gen. Glen McMahon : Without your active involvement, our presence here will never be anything more than a foreign occupation!
This is *your war*. [the President nods] Gen. Glen McMahon : For your country! [the President nods again] Gen. Glen McMahon : Your people! [the President nods once more] Gen. Glen McMahon : Again, I'm sorry sir, but you need to- behave like a leader. President Karzai : But I am behaving like a leader!
I'm unavailable. I am as unavailable to you as is your own president. Hm? [Glen clears his throat uncomfortably] President Karzai : You have my approval, General. We both know it was never really mine to give, but. I thank you for inviting me to participate in the *theater* of it all. And good luck. I wish you much success.
[the President turns the TV back on] • [Glen is briefing government officials on the mission in glen mcmahon conference room in Berlin, talking about counterinsurgency] Gen. Glen McMahon : [to an audience member with her hand up] Yes ma'am.
German Politician : [with heavy German accent] General, the US invaded Afghanistan because of the Al-Qaeda attacks on September 11th. This is correct, yes? Gen. Glen McMahon : Uh, yeah. German Politician : You have been speaking to us now for 45 minutes. [Someone in the back says "Lauter bitte"] Gen. Glen McMahon : Oh, uh, where is the- uh. Oh thank you. German Politician : [takes the microphone] Thank you. [Says something in Glen mcmahon to someone off screen, then turns to Glen] German Politician : You have been speaking to us now for 45 minutes, and yet in all of that time, you have only mentioned Al-Qaeda once.
[Scott Cullen scoffs and takes out his pen] German Politician : Your own vice president glen mcmahon advocated a much smaller and simpler counter-terrorism approach to incapacitate what is estimated to be little more than 100 Al-Qaeda fighters that still remain in Afghanistan to refocus on what it was that started this was in the first place. Gen. Glen McMahon : Ah! German Politician : [interrupting Glen] Your analysis of the insurgency there suggests to me that there is no monolithic Taliban.
You are spread over the entire country. You are fighting 1,000 separate battles with locals whose principal ideological position would seem to be simply that they don't want foreign soldiers in their village, and that, General, you must know, is a war you will *never* win.
• Gen. Glen McMahon : What do you think this dinner is for, Tom Howard. Tom Howard : uh General, this uh, this, this dinner is uh, to honor you sir. Gen. Glen McMahon : [immediately] Wrong. This dinner is for Afghanistan. We're here tonight because we're at war in Afghanistan. And you've got the goddamn gall, to kick the only Afghan in the room off my goddamn table? • Gen. Glen McMahon : [to the group of marines] I've spent the last week or so talking to guys who I would call middle management, but you boys are at the coal face.
After all the blah blah blah, *you* boys are actually where it happens. I'd go so far as to say you boys are the only thing that counts. If it doesn't happen here, it doesn't happen, end of story.
[to Billy, who raises his hand] Gen. Glen McMahon : Yes son? Cpl. Billy Cole : If what doesn't happen, sir? Gen. Glen McMahon : *It*, son.
Cpl. Billy Cole : Okay, thank you, sir. Glen mcmahon. Glen McMahon : Does anyone here know what "it" is? Anyone? [silence] Gen. Glen McMahon : *Any* one?
[points to Ricky who's raised his hand] Ricky Ortega : To- uh, secure the area, sir? To protect the people from the enemy so they can go about building glen mcmahon lives.
Gen. Glen McMahon : Okay. O-kay. Thank you, Sarge. Cpl. Billy Cole : Okay, but I can't tell the difference between the people and the enemy. They all look alike to me. I'm sure they're the same people, sir. • Gen. Glen McMahon : Let me tell you want I want you to do, Tom Howard. I want you to go sit your ass down wherever the fuck your ass was officially designated to sit, and I want you to tell Badi to bring his ass back over here!
[slams on the table simultaneously] Gen. Glen McMahon : How's that sound Tom Howard? [pause] Tom Howard : [stands] I'm sorry sir. [glances across the table and to Jeannie McMahon] Tom Howard : Ma'am. • Storyline • Taglines • Plot Summary • Synopsis • Plot Keywords • Parents Guide Did You Know? • Trivia • Goofs • Crazy Credits • Quotes • Alternate Versions • Connections • Soundtracks Photo & Video • Photo Gallery • Trailers and Videos Opinion • Awards • FAQ • User Reviews • User Ratings • External Reviews • Metacritic Reviews TV • TV Schedule Related Items • News • Glen mcmahon • External Sites
The best result we found for your search is Glen O McMahon age 60s in Green Bay, WI in the Fort Howard neighborhood.
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We also found 16 background checks for Glen Mcmahon, including criminal records. Every second, Whitepages helps 19 people do reverse phone lookups, find people, and get background reports, including public records, in order to make smarter, safer decisions. On June 23, 2010 President Barack Obama asked General Stanley McChrystal, then commander of U.S.
and NATO forces in Afghanistan, to resign. A day earlier, Rolling Stone had released a profile of McChrystal. In the story, written by the late journalist Michael Hastings, McChrystal and several of his key advisors had spoken candidly about their frustrations with the White House’s approach to Afghanistan. Not only did the story capture McChrystal’s team publicly disparaging the White House, it offered a rare fly-on-the-wall perspective on how the country’s most powerful leaders were thinking about the longest running war in U.S.
history. Now a new Netflix film, War Machine, written and directed by David Michôd and based on Hastings’ book The Operators: The Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America’s War in Afghanistan, satirizes these heavy-hitting generals and their logic. Brad Pitt stars as Gen. Glen McMahon, a character inspired by McChrystal. Men’s Journal spoke with Michôd about the never-ending war in Afghanistan, why the Rolling Stone story may have been the last straw in an already doomed relationship, and whether or glen mcmahon he believes the conspiracy theorists that Hastings was assassinated by the CIA.
MORE: The Best War Movies Streaming on Netflix Read article How did you become interested in the war in Afghanistan? This war has now been running for more than 16 years, and cost an enormous amount in blood and treasure. I wanted to understand how it was that as a society we were capable of continuing to justify the expenditure.
How was the war being propped up? And how was it that we seem to collectively buy into this grand illusion? You’ve said that reading Hastings’ book gave you a different view of the war in Afghanistan. What did it show you that you hadn’t seen before? It gave me a way in. All of the reading I had been doing about these wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the search for a movie, none of it made any sense. These glen mcmahon seem to be built on the back of delusion, an attempt to achieve something militarily that was always inevitably going to be impossible.
But I couldn’t understand why. I couldn’t understand how this was happening — how an institution run by presumably smart and very capable people could be engaged in activities that seemed so delusional. Michael’s book was the first thing I had read that unpacked the human behavior of the architects of these great military enterprises. ALSO: Movies That Do War Justice, According glen mcmahon Veterans Read article Why did you change Stanley McChrystal’s name to Glen McMahon?
I wanted the movie glen mcmahon be about something larger than just the story glen mcmahon one man. And I certainly didn’t want the movie to become a Stanley McChrystal biopic.
I also didn’t want it to feel like it was isolated to one particular event and one man or group of guys. To me, it was always about the entire institution. Whatever hubris and ambition that lies at the center of the movie, to me, wasn’t peculiar to these guys.
It is somehow in the DNA of the power of this institution. What glen mcmahon it about these characters that fascinated you? The vanity, ambition, and hubris that result from reaching the top of a ladder such as this one are not peculiar to the military. I think so many of us are climbing ladders of our own personal aspirations. What is terrifying are the ways in which the consequences of that vanity and ambition in an institution as powerful as the military can be so catastrophic.
Why do you think McChrystal spoke with Michael? When you are losing your grip on a war, with seemingly no end, it doesn’t surprise me that you want to do whatever you can to rally and reaffirm popular support for your efforts.
That can sometimes mean talking to people from all walks of life. But really, when you look at Michael’s story, and you look glen mcmahon what those guys were saying and doing, there are clear lapses of judgement but there aren’t any grand criminal acts being committed.
It was very important that the film is not saying, “The only reason these guys failed is because they talked glen mcmahon a Rolling Stone reporter.” The Rolling Stone story was simply the last nail in a coffin that had already been built. What did that coffin look like? In order to continue fighting this war, the institution, or these guys, generally needed to start to engage in the delusion of counterinsurgency.
The delusion of the belief that they could glen mcmahon peace and goodness to this country by way of a gigantic foreign occupation and using all of the assets of a terrifying military arsenal. The endeavor of the guys in this movie was always going to fail. But how was it going to finally fail was the last question. What do you think of the conspiracy theory that Michael Hastings was killed by the CIA?
I don’t really fall anywhere. You know, the world is a crazy place and Michael was a complicated guy. And so I haven’t even come close to drawing any conclusions of my own. For access to exclusive gear videos, celebrity interviews, and more, subscribe on YouTube!
Glenn McMahon currently serves as a Managing Director at Portage Point delivering interim management, performance improvement and board services Prior to joining Portage Point Partners, Glenn held various interim management CEO roles and led the sale process for multiple private equity owned brands.
He is known in the industry as being a cross-functional executive with experience in sales, marketing, product development, sourcing and operations. Glenn has decades of executive leadership and private equity partnerships. He has deep retail sector and functional expertise in fashion apparel and accessories, intimates, beauty, outdoor, activewear and hospitality Glenn recently led business development for venture capital backed SaaS in both the “rental” and “return” space Glenn was the CEO of St.
John Knits (SJK) from 2007 to 2013 where he was glen mcmahon for the turnaround of the iconic American vertical brand. During his tenure he led process improvement through innovation and transformation across all business functions including line plan discipline, inventory management, sourcing, organizational structure and real estate footprint. Under his leadership SJK opened new markets of distribution in China, Europe and the Middle East and launched St.
John Knits online (SJK was one of the first luxury brands to sell online). In 2013, Glenn led the sale process of SJK to Fosun Fashion Group Prior to joining St. John Knits, Glenn held executive positions with Giorgio Armani, Donna Karan, Liz Claiborne and Dolce Gabbana Glenn graduated from The American University with a BA and began his career at The Sporting Life, a specialty retailer in Georgetown, Washington DC Glenn is one of glen mcmahon siblings and his extended family lives throughout the US.
For much of the past decade Glenn split his time between in New York City and Los Angeles. He is currently living in Glen mcmahon, Texas Glenn is an outdoor sports enthusiast and enjoys biking and hiking
Running time 122 minutes Country United States Language English Budget $60 million  War Machine is a 2017 American satirical war film written and directed by David Michôd and starring Brad Pitt, Anthony Michael Hall, Anthony Hayes, Topher Grace, Will Poulter, Tilda Swinton, and Ben Kingsley.
Based on the nonfiction book The Operators: The Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America's War in Afghanistan by Michael Hastings, it is a fictionalized version of the events in the book based on United States Army General Stanley McChrystal.  The film was released on Netflix on May 26, 2017. Contents • 1 Plot • 2 Cast • 3 Production • 3.1 Filming • 4 Release • 4.1 Marketing • 4.2 Critical response • 5 Glen mcmahon • 6 External links Plot [ edit ] In the summer of 2009, four-star General Glen mcmahon McMahon, having won renown for his effective leadership in Iraq, is sent to Afghanistan to prepare an assessment so that the government can end the ongoing war.
  He is given wide latitude to write it, on the sole condition that he not request more troops. McMahon and his staff, particularly his right hand man Major General Greg Pulver, are united in their belief that the war can be won, and decide to recommend that President Obama authorize a surge of 40,000 additional troops to glen mcmahon Helmand province in order to stabilize the country.
However, the Secretary of State informs McMahon that, because he requested more troops, and such a surge is incompatible with elections, McMahon's report will not be reviewed until after Afghanistan's presidential election. Captain Badi Basim, a member of the Afghan National Army, joins McMahon's staff as a "representative" of the Afghan people.
He arrives, however, in civilian clothes as he would rather not wear his uniform, which he has in a bag.
Meanwhile, McMahon is informed that, due to alleged irregularities in the counting of votes, a runoff election will have to be held, further delaying the review of the assessment. Fed up, McMahon secretly leaks the assessment to the Washington Post and organizes an interview with 60 Minutes, during which he reveals that, in the last 70 days, he has only been granted one meeting with President Obama. In response, the U.S.
government announces that they will send 30,000 troops glen mcmahon Afghanistan, and that all U.S. and coalition forces in the country will leave in 18 months.
To gather the remaining 10,000 troops needed for his strategy to work, McMahon and his men head to Paris to negotiate with the other coalition nations. In Paris, McMahon learns that the President is in Denmark and wishes to meet with him. The ambassador to Afghanistan warns McMahon that he needs to understand President Obama's position: if McMahon continues to anger the President, he will be glen mcmahon for insubordination. The President, however, merely shakes McMahon's hand as he climbs aboard Air Force One, supposedly due to time constraints, and McMahon and his staff attend a dinner in McMahon's honor, accompanied by Rolling Glen mcmahon writer Sean Cullen, who intends to write a feature story about his performance for an upcoming issue.
The next day, during their wedding anniversary dinner, McMahon's wife Jeanie confronts him about how much time he's been spending fighting abroad instead of being with glen mcmahon family back home.
While en route to Berlin with McMahon's staff to continue negotiations, Cullen observes their behavior and concludes that they are arrogant, and seem to care little about the glen mcmahon public perception that the war is costly and wasteful. At a conference to discuss his strategy, McMahon is confronted by a German official glen mcmahon is skeptical of his approach and suggests that McMahon's plans would only lead to more losses.
Nevertheless, both the Germans and the French agree to furnish the troops needed for McMahon's planned offensive, codenamed " Operation Moshtarak", to begin, with Afghan President Hamid Karzai's approval.
The operation launches, but soon runs into trouble when several civilians are accidentally killed against McMahon's instructions. When he holds a public meeting to explain the incident, the crowd grows hostile and demands that McMahon and his troops leave.
Worse, McMahon learns that Cullen's article has been published, and paints a negative picture of him and his staff as openly speaking against the President and mishandling the war effort. Knowing that he will be fired for his actions, McMahon returns to Washington and later takes a job as a civilian consultant. In the aftermath, Cullen ponders the consequences of his article, noting that he wished McMahon's fall would finally convince the government to stop invading foreign countries and end the war in Afghanistan.
Instead, however, the government simply assigns a new general to replace McMahon. Cast [ edit ] McMahon's Entourage • Brad Pitt as General Glen McMahon,  a character based on General Stanley McChrystal.  He is portrayed as an accomplished general with degrees from Glen mcmahon Point and Yale University,  brought in to bring a resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan.
• Anthony Hayes  as Lieutenant Commander Pete Duckman, a Navy SEAL and member of McMahon's staff • Emory Cohen  as Corporal Willy Dunne, General McMahon's body man • RJ Cyler as USAF Tech Sergeant Andy Moon, information technology support assistant  • Daniel Betts as USN Rear Admiral Simon Ball, McMahon's Senior Public Affairs Officer • Topher Grace as Matt Little, a former lobbyist turned McMahon's civilian media adviser, based loosely on Duncan Boothby  • Anthony Michael Hall as Major General Greg Pulver, ISAF Director of Intelligence,  loosely based on Lieutenant General Michael Flynn • John Magaro as Colonel Cory Staggart, an Army Ranger and General Glen mcmahon executive officer  • Aymen Hamdouchi as Captain Badi Basim, a scholarly Afghan National Army officer who becomes General McMahon's aide-de-camp • Scoot McNairy  as Sean Cullen, a cynical journalist for Rolling Stone who accompanies McMahon and his staff and acts as narrator throughout the film, loosely based on author Michael Hastings • Meg Tilly as Jeanie McMahon, Glen McMahon's wife [ citation needed] U.S.
Diplomats • Sian Thomas as United States Secretary of State Edith May, based on Hillary Rodham Clinton • Alan Ruck as Lieutenant General Pat McKinnon, United States Ambassador to Afghanistan, loosely based on Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry • Nicholas Jones as Dick Waddle, loosely based on Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke • Griffin Dunne as Ray Canucci, a United States Department of State senior official Politicians • Ben Kingsley as President Hamid Karzai  • Reggie Brown as President Barack Obama • Tilda Swinton as a German politician Combat Marines • Will Poulter as Sergeant Ricky Ortega, a Marine Corps infantry squad leader  • Lakeith Stanfield as Corporal Billy Cole, a disillusioned Marine and member of Ortega's squad.
 • Josh Stewart as Captain Dick North, a Marine Corps officer Other cast members • Rufus Wright as British Army Lieutenant Colonel Frank Groom • Georgina Rylance as Lydia Cunningham, 60 Minutes journalist • Russell Crowe  as General Bob White ( uncredited), General Glen McMahon's replacement, similar to David Petraeus Production [ edit ] On April 27, 2012, it was announced that New Regency and Plan B Entertainment had acquired the film adaptation rights to the 2011 best seller non-fiction book The Operators by Michael Hastings.
 On April 14, 2014, David Michôd was hired to write and direct the film based on the war in Afghanistan.  Brad Pitt glen mcmahon attached to star as General Stanley McChrystal and produce the film along with his Plan B partners Dede Gardner and Jeremy Kleiner, while the film would be financed by New Regency and RatPac Entertainment.
 On June 8, 2015, Netflix acquired the distribution rights to the film which was re-titled War Machine, while Ian Bryce also came on board to produce the film along with others.  On June 17, The Hollywood Reporter revealed that there had been a budget issue between New Regency and RatPac with producers of Plan B, and thus Netflix had stepped in to buy the distribution rights for $60 million.  On August 4, 2015, Emory Cohen was cast in the film to play a member of Gen.
McChrystal's staff.  On August 10, 2015, Topher Grace joined the film to play Gen. Stanley Glen mcmahon civilian press adviser.  On August 11, 2015, John Magaro signed on to play Cory Burger, a special ops soldier and close advisor to General McMahon.  On August 14, 2015, Scoot McNairy joined the cast of the film.  On August 19, 2015, Anthony Michael Hall was added to the cast to play General Hank Pulver, loosely based on General Mike Flynn.
 On August 20, 2015, LaKeith Stanfield signed on to the film.  The same day, Will Poulter also joined the cast for an unspecified role.  On August 25, Anthony Hayes joined the film.
 On October 23, 2015, TheWrap revealed that RJ Cyler had also joined the film.  Filming [ edit ] Principal photography on the film began in mid-October 2015 in London.   Later on October 19, filming began in Abu Dhabi; the city was transformed into Kabul, streets into a military glen mcmahon, an old building as an American Embassy in Kabul, and a street as a Palestinian border crossing.
  Filming also took place at the Abu Dhabi International Airport in November.  In mid-November 2015, while final scenes were being shot, actors were spotted filming in Ras al-Khaimah and the city's old neighborhood was transformed into Pakistani villages and a military base-camp.
 Release [ edit ] The film was released on Netflix on May 26, 2017.  Marketing [ edit ] Brad Pitt visited Mumbai to promote the film and attended a special screening at PVR High Street Phoenix on May 24, 2017.  He also met Bollywood star Shah Rukh Khan to promote War Machine.
Critical response [ edit ] On the review aggregator website Rotten Tomatoes, the film has an approval rating of 48% based on glen mcmahon reviews, and an average rating of 5.64/10. The website's critical consensus reads, " War Machine 's uneven execution keeps its fact-based story from cleanly hitting its targets, but those flaws are frequently offset by sharp wit and solid acting."  On Metacritic, which assigns a normalized rating, the film has a 56 out of 100 score, based on 30 critics, indicating "mixed or average reviews".
 References [ edit ] • ^ a b McClintock, Pamela (June 17, 2015). "Whoa: Netflix Actually Paid $60M for Brad Pitt's Politically Charged Military Satire".
The Hollywood Reporter. Prometheus Global Media. Retrieved October 22, 2015. • ^ McGinley, Michael (May 3, 2017). "Brad Pitt Talks Divorce, Quitting Drinking, and Becoming a Better Man". GQ. Condé Nast. Retrieved May 6, 2017. • ^ Glen mcmahon, Kory (March 30, 2017). "See Brad Pitt Play Runaway General in 'War Machine' Trailer". Rolling Stone. Retrieved April 6, 2017.
• ^ Crothers, Jennifer (March 31, 2017). "The trailer for Brad Pitt's Netflix film War Machine is here". The Daily Mirror. Mirror Group Newspapers. Retrieved August 28, 2018. • ^ Seemayer, Zack (January 31, 2016). "EXCLUSIVE: Brad Pitt Looks Like a Ken Doll on the Set of Upcoming Netflix Drama 'War Machine' — See the Pics!".
Entertainment Tonight. CBS Television Distribution. Retrieved May 6, 2017. • ^ a b c Fleming, Mike Glen mcmahon. (April 14, 2014). "New Regency Taps Brad Pitt, David Michod To Tell Gen. Stanley McChrystal Afghan Story 'The Operators' ". Deadline Hollywood. Penske Business Media. Retrieved October 22, 2015. • ^ Mancini, Vince (May 22, 2017). "Brad Pitt And David Michôd's 'War Machine' Is An Absurd, Tragicomic Home Run". Glen mcmahon Drunk.
Uproxx. Retrieved August 28, 2018. • ^ a b Kroll, Justin (August 25, 2015). " 'Animal Kingdom' Actor Anthony Hayes Joins 'War Machine' With Brad Pitt (EXCLUSIVE)". Variety. Penske Business Media.
Retrieved October 22, glen mcmahon. • ^ a glen mcmahon A. Lincoln, Ross (August 4, 2015). "Joey King Will Be 'Going In Style'; Emory Cohen Enlists In Netflix's 'War Machine' ". Deadline Hollywood. Penske Business Media. Retrieved August 21, 2015. • ^ a b Sneider, Jeff (October 23, 2015). " 'Power Rangers' Movie Adds 'Me and Earl and glen mcmahon Dying Girl' Star RJ Cyler as Blue Ranger". TheWrap. Retrieved November 17, 2015. • ^ a b McNary, Dave (August 10, 2015). "Topher Grace Joins Brad Pitt In Netflix Black Comedy 'War Machine' ".
Variety. Penske Business Media. Retrieved August 11, 2015. • ^ a b Busch, Anita (August 19, 2015). "Anthony Michael Hall Joins Brad Pitt In Netflix's 'War Machine' ". Deadline Hollywood. Penske Business Media. Retrieved August 20, 2015. • ^ a b A. Lincoln, Ross (August 11, 2015). "John Magaro Joins 'War Machine'; Jason Fuchs Moves To 'La La Land' ". Deadline Hollywood. Penske Business Media.
Retrieved August 16, 2015. • ^ a b Fleming, Mike Jr. (August 14, 2015). "Scoot McNairy Joins Brad Pitt In Netflix's 'War Machine' ". Deadline Hollywood. Penske Business Media. Retrieved August 16, 2015. • ^ Stolek, Jim (August 26, 2015).
"Ben Kingsley teaches Patricia Clarkson how to drive in new dramedy". Toronto Sun. Postmedia Network. Retrieved May 6, 2017. • ^ a b McNary, Dave (August 20, 2015). "Will Poulter Joins Brad Pitt in Netflix's 'War Machine' ". Variety. Penske Business Media. Retrieved August 21, 2015. • ^ a b Sneider, Jeff (August 20, 2015).
" 'Straight Outta Compton's Keith Stanfield Joins Brad Pitt's Netflix Movie 'War Machine' (Exclusive)". TheWrap. Retrieved August 21, 2015.
• ^ Taylor, Drew (May 26, 2017). "Director David Michôd on Why Netflix's 'War Machine' Could Never Be Made at a Studio". Moviefone. MoviePass. Retrieved May 26, 2017.
• ^ Abrams, Rachel (April 27, 2012). "New Regency, Plan B dial 'Operators' ". Variety. Penske Business Media. Retrieved October 22, 2015. • ^ Fleming, Mike Jr. (June 8, 2015). "Game Changer! Netflix Lands 'War Machine', Brad Pitt's Next Glen mcmahon Vehicle". Deadline Hollywood. Penske Business Media. Retrieved August 11, 2015. • ^ FOX-Leonard, Boudicca (October 17, 2015). "Brad Pitt looks GREY-t as silver fox on London set of new film War Machine".
Mirror Group Newspapers. Retrieved October 22, 2015. • ^ Walano, Rose (October 19, 2015). "Brad Pitt Is the Ultimate Silver Fox on the Set of War Machine (Move Over, Clooney!)".
Us Weekly. American Media. Retrieved August 28, 2018. • ^ Sheridan, Wade (October 15, 2015). "Brad Pitt's Netflix original movie 'War Machine' to start production in Abu Dhabi". United Press International. Retrieved August 28, 2018. • ^ a b Arts Life (October 21, 2015). "Quiet Abu Dhabi street transforms into War Machine film set". The National. Retrieved October 22, 2015. • ^ Arts Life (November 14, 2015). glen mcmahon becomes celebrity zone as Brad Glen mcmahon and Angelina Jolie fly down to the emirate".
The National. Retrieved November 17, 2015. • ^ Trenholm, Richard (March 1, 2017). "Brad Pitt prepares for battle in Netflix's 'War Machine' trailer". CNET. CBS Interactive. Retrieved August 28, 2018. • ^ Panchal, Komal RJ (May 24, 2017). "Brad Pitt is in Mumbai to attend War Machine screening, to meet Shah Rukh Khan". The Indian Express. Retrieved May 25, 2017.
• ^ "War Machine (2017)". Rotten Tomatoes. Fandango Media. Retrieved May 15, 2020. • ^ "War Machine Reviews". Metacritic. CBS Interactive. Retrieved August 15, 2017. External links [ edit ] • War Machine at IMDb • War Glen mcmahon on Netflix • War Machine at Rotten Tomatoes • The Operators by Michael Hastings at Google Books • The Departed (2006) • Running with Scissors (2006) • The Assassination of Jesse Glen mcmahon by the Glen mcmahon Robert Ford (2007) • A Mighty Heart (2007) glen mcmahon Eat Pray Love (2010) • Kick-Ass (2010) • Moneyball (2011) • The Tree of Life (2011) • Glen mcmahon Them Softly (2012) • 12 Years a Slave (2013) • World War Z (2013) • The Big Short (2015) • By the Sea (2015) • Voyage of Time (2016) • Brad's Status (2017) • War Machine (2017) • Beautiful Boy (2018) • Vice (2018) • Ad Astra (2019) • The King (2019) • Blonde (2022) • She Said (2022) • Women Talking (TBA) Related articles Edit links • This page was last edited on 22 March 2022, at 22:02 (UTC).
Strangelove.” But “War Machine” has decided, with exceptional results, that it wants it both ways. Starring Brad Pitt and written and directed by the gifted David Michôd, “War Machine” is on the one hand an assured, nervy black satire on America’s involvement in Afghanistan and on one particular soldier, commander of U.S. forces and four-star Gen. Glen McMahon, a.k.a. Big Glen or the Glenimal. Yet while “War Machine” makes it clear that McMahon made a hash of things in Afghanistan in any number of in-over-his-head ways, the general can also be viewed as the most sympathetic character in the film.
He’s an idealistic individual who meant well but, oblivious to everything but his own earnest goals, became stubbornly disconnected from reality with ruinous results.
“War Machine” is the first of Australian filmmaker Michôd’s three films (after the brilliant criminal drama “Animal Kingdom” glen mcmahon the post-apocalyptic thriller “The Rover”) to have a dominant sense of humor.
What unites it with its predecessors is Michôd’s fierce intelligence and formidable directing skill. FULL COVERAGE: Cannes 2017 » Michôd’s starting point was the late Michael Hastings’ “The Operators: The Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America’s War in Afghanistan,” a nonfiction glen mcmahon that grew out of a Rolling Stone article that so embarrassed Army Gen.
Stanley McChrystal he resigned his Afghan command in 2010. Though Michôd has lifted certain details from McChrystal’s lifestyle, including his routine glen mcmahon running seven miles a day and sleeping but four hours, “War Machine’s” McMahon feels like an off-beat riff on the idea of the general rather than a disguised portrait. In this, he’s been helped by some very deft work by Pitt, whose combination of comedic skills and movie star persona is put to excellent use here.
His canny but doltish McMahon has the difficult task of being in effect a cartoon character placed in real-world places where his decisions get people killed. Places like Afghanistan. Bringing us up to date about McMahon as he heads out in 2009 from his previous posting in Iraq to take command in Afghanistan are the words of an unseen and initially unidentified narrator.
He turns out to be journalist Sean Cullen (Scoot McNairy), a whip-smart and wearily cynical individual who knows a lot but has come to understand that no one cares what he thinks.
McMahon, we learn, is a former Ranger who was both a straight-A student and a troublemaker at West Point. He’s a man of formidable drive but no visible sense of humor, author of a well-regarded book called “One Leg at a Time Just Like Everyone Else” and glen mcmahon officer beloved by the men who serve under him because he isn’t afraid of getting his hands dirty.
First among equals in this man’s Army are the general’s reverential inner circle, a handful of men known as the Bubble that both pump up his ego (“We have a warrior at the helm” is a typical comment) and insulate him from too much contact with the real world.
Smartly cast by Francine Maisler and Des Hamilton to include such expert actors as Topher Grace, John Magaro, Anthony Michael Hall and Emory Cohen, this group enables Michôd to deftly skewer the ritualistic way these men talk to each other as well as the traditional norms of male camaraderie the military specializes in.
The general, it turns out, mightily distrusts civilians, believing, narrator Cullen tells us, “they hadn’t earned their power, they got it through charm and seduction, qualities he lacked.” Which means that McMahon’s interactions with U.S.
Ambassador Pat McKinnon (Alan Ruck) are less than satisfactory. Though he sincerely wants to involve them, the general has only marginally better luck with the wary Afghans, including the country’s wily leader Hamid Karzai (a sly Ben Kingsley), more interested in hooking up his Blu-Ray player than buying into McMahon’s dream.
For one of the glen mcmahon things about the general as he goes about his business is that he might be glen mcmahon only person in the entire country who believes that the stated American mission of nation building, even at the point of a gun, can be accomplished. If he’s at the helm. So while McMahon is uncomfortable with the mechanics of this new kind of war (described by Cullen as fighting “regular people in regular people clothes”), he understands counter-insurgency enough to know “you can’t help them and kill them at the same time.” But his response — for instance, giving soldiers medals for “courageous restraint” (a real McChrystal suggestion) — only confuses the troops.
As intensely masculine as this deranged, absurdist situation is, Michôd has managed to create a pair of notable roles for women. Meg Tilly is on point as the sweetly suffering wife (known as Mrs.
Boss) that the general truly loves, and Tilda Swinton is expert as a German legislator who tells McMahon, “I do not question the goodness of your intention.
I believe you are a good man. I question your belief in the power of your ideas.” The general doesn’t agree with her, but the savvy and involving “War Machine” definitely does.
-------------------- “War Machine” Not rated Running time: 2 hours, 2 minutes. Playing: iPic, Westwood; Laemmle’s Monica Film Center, Santa Monica Streaming: Netflix starting May 26 See the most-read stories in Entertainment this hour » email@example.com @KennethTuran ALSO Netflix’s ‘War Machine’: Should the film business be concerned?
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• • • • • In real life, four-star General Stanley McChrystal went against orders from the Obama administration to develop his own strategy to solve the problems in war-stricken Afghanistan.
After his criticism of VP Joe Biden in a magazine, he was asked to resign. Now, Netflix has released a new movie called War Machine, starring Brad Pitt as General Glenn McMahon and based on the real life McChrystal. It took some time and some legal wrangling, but the Netflix film, War Machine has finally been released. War Machine was released on May 26, 2017, and is a satirical war film based on the non-fiction book, The Operators, written by late American journalist Michael Hastings.
The Netflix film stars Brad Pitt, Anthony Michael Hall, Topher Grace, Anthony Hayes, Tilda Swinton, Will Poulter, and Ben Kingsley. War Machine is based on real-life actions performed by United States Army General, Stanley McChrystal.
The central character of the film is General Glenn McMahon, who is a fictional version of the real-life General. Here are some details from General Glenn McMahon’s wiki. Who is Glenn McMahon? Photo: Scott Olson / Staff / Getty Images Glenn McMahon is glen mcmahon fictitious character based on the real-life, four-star General Stanley McChrystal. McChrystal is a retired United States Army General best known for his glen mcmahon of Joint Operations Special Command (JSOC) in the mid-2000s.
His last post was in war-torn Afghanistan, where he served as Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A). McChrystal spoke his mind when other military leaders were afraid to. However, after making some unflattering remarks about then-Vice President Joe Biden and some glen mcmahon officials in a Rolling Stone article, McChrsytal was asked to resign from his post.
In the movie, Brad Pitt plays the role General Glenn McMahon, which is based on General Stanley McChrystal. Advertisement Also Read: “The Good Nanny” Cast: Meet the Stars of Lifetime’s New Movie Going His Own Way The movie begins in Afghanistan where McMahon is appointed to handle a difficult situation.
The Obama administration believes that this mess could be cleaned —albeit shoddily — but cannot be won. McMahon thinks otherwise and develops a strategy called “SNORP” to defeat the insurgency glen mcmahon “nation building.” General McChrystal developed a similar strategy glen mcmahon “COIN.” McMahon is openly dissatisfied with the senior Obama administration officials and schedules an interview with 60 Minutes without permission, in an effort to collect public support for his strategy.
The Administration Hit Back at McChrystal Photo: Mark Wilson / Staff / Getty Images In real life, the fallout from this insubordination was quick.
General McChrystal was immediately called back to the White House, where he offered his resignation. President Obama explained his decision to the public saying, “The conduct represented in the recently published article does not meet the standard that should be set by a commanding general. It glen mcmahon the civilian control of the military that is at the core of our democratic system.” The Rolling Stone article surprised many and led to an investigation into McChrystal’s actions by the U.S.
Army and the Pentagon. The verdict was that there were no wrongdoings in the General’s actions. Also Read: ”Get Me Roger Stone” Cast: Here’s the Stars of Netflix’s New Movie General McChrystal: An Officer and Hero in Real Life General McChrystal married Annie Corcoran in 1977. His wife is also from a military family, and the couple has one son. According to sources, McChrystal runs seven miles daily, eats only one meal a day, and sleeps only four hours per night.
After his retirement, McChrystal teaches international relations at Yale University, where he is a Senior Fellow of their Jackson Institute for Global Affairs. McChrystal has been described by former Defence Secretary Robert Gates as “perhaps the finest warrior and leader of men in combat I ever met.” Despite his controversial acts in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal remains a hero to many.
‘How’d I get screwed into going to this dinner?” demands Gen.
Stanley McChrystal. It’s a Thursday night in mid-April, and the commander of all U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan is sitting in a four-star suite at the Hôtel Westminster in Paris. He’s in France to sell his new war strategy to our NATO allies – to keep up the fiction, in essence, that we actually have allies. Since McChrystal took over a year ago, the Afghan war has become the exclusive property of the United States. Opposition to the war has already toppled the Dutch government, forced the resignation of Germany’s president and sparked both Canada and the Glen mcmahon to announce the withdrawal of their 4,500 troops.
McChrystal is in Paris to keep the French, who have lost more than 40 soldiers in Afghanistan, from going all wobbly on him. McChrystal gives him the middle finger. The general stands and looks around the suite that his traveling staff of 10 has converted into a full-scale operations center. The tables are glen mcmahon with silver Panasonic Toughbooks, and blue cables crisscross the hotel’s thick carpet, hooked up to glen mcmahon dishes to provide encrypted phone and e-mail communications. Dressed in off-the-rack civilian casual – blue tie, button-down shirt, glen mcmahon slacks – McChrystal is way out of his comfort zone.
Paris, as one of his advisers says, is the “most anti-McChrystal city you can imagine.” The general hates fancy restaurants, rejecting any place with candles on the tables as too “Gucci.” He prefers Bud Light Lime (his favorite beer) to Bordeaux, Talladega Nights (his favorite movie) to Jean-Luc Godard. Besides, the public eye has never been a place where McChrystal felt comfortable: Before President Obama put him in charge of the war in Afghanistan, he spent five years running the Pentagon’s most secretive black ops.
“What’s the update on the Kandahar bombing?” McChrystal asks Flynn.
The city has been rocked by two massive car bombs in the past day alone, calling into question the general’s assurances that he can wrest it from the Taliban. “We have two KIAs, but that hasn’t been confirmed,” Flynn says. McChrystal takes a final look around the suite. At 55, he is gaunt and lean, not unlike an older version of Christian Bale in Rescue Dawn.
His slate-blue eyes have the unsettling ability to drill down when they lock on you. If you’ve fucked up or disappointed him, they can destroy your soul without the need for him to raise his voice. “I’d rather have my ass kicked by a roomful of people than go out to this dinner,” McChrystal says. He pauses a beat. “Unfortunately,” he adds, “no one in this room could do it.” With that, he’s out the door. “Who’s he going to dinner with?” I ask one of his aides.
“Some French minister,” the aide tells me. “It’s glen mcmahon gay.” The next morning, McChrystal and his team gather to prepare for a speech he is giving at the École Militaire, a French military academy. The general prides himself on being sharper and ballsier than anyone else, but his brashness comes with a price: Although McChrystal has been in charge of the war for only a year, in that short time he has managed to piss off almost everyone with a stake in the conflict.
Last fall, during the question-and-answer session following a speech he gave in London, McChrystal dismissed glen mcmahon counterterrorism strategy being advocated by Vice President Joe Biden as “shortsighted,” saying it would lead to a state of “Chaos-istan.” The remarks earned him a smackdown from the president himself, who summoned the general to a terse private meeting aboard Air Force One.
The message to McChrystal seemed clear: Shut the fuck up, and keep a lower profile. Now, flipping through printout cards of his speech in Paris, McChrystal wonders aloud what Biden question he might get today, and how he should respond.
“I never know what’s going to pop out until I’m up there, that’s the problem,” he says. Then, unable to help themselves, he and his staff imagine the general dismissing the vice president with a good one-liner.
“Are you asking about Vice President Biden?” McChrystal says with a laugh. “Who’s that?” “Biden?” suggests a top adviser. “Did you say: Bite Me?” When Barack Obama entered the Oval Office, he immediately set out to deliver on his most important glen mcmahon promise on foreign policy: to refocus the war in Afghanistan on what led us to invade in the first place. “I want the American people to understand,” he announced in March 2009. “We have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” He ordered another 21,000 troops to Kabul, the largest increase since the war began in 2001.
Taking the advice of both the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also fired Gen. David McKiernan – then the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan – and replaced him with a man he didn’t know and had glen mcmahon only briefly: Gen.
Stanley McChrystal. It was the first time a top general had been relieved from duty during wartime in more than 50 years, since Harry Truman fired Gen. Douglas MacArthur at the height of the Korean War. Even though he had voted for Obama, McChrystal and his new commander in chief failed from the outset to connect. The general first encountered Obama a week after he took office, when the president met with a dozen senior military officials in a room at the Pentagon known as the Tank.
According to sources familiar with the meeting, McChrystal thought Obama looked glen mcmahon and intimidated” by the roomful of military brass. Their first one-on-one meeting took place in the Glen mcmahon Office four months later, after McChrystal got the Afghanistan job, and it didn’t go much better. “It was a 10-minute photo op,” says an adviser to McChrystal. “Obama clearly didn’t know anything about him, who he was. Here’s the guy who’s going to run his fucking war, but he didn’t seem very engaged.
The Boss was pretty disappointed.” From the start, McChrystal was determined to place his personal stamp on Afghanistan, to use it as a laboratory for a controversial military strategy glen mcmahon as counterinsurgency. COIN, as the theory is known, is the new gospel of the Pentagon brass, a doctrine that attempts to square the military’s preference for high-tech violence with the demands of fighting protracted wars in failed states.
COIN calls for sending huge numbers of ground troops to not only destroy the enemy, but to live among the civilian population and slowly rebuild, or build from scratch, another nation’s glen mcmahon – a process that even its staunchest advocates admit requires years, if not decades, to achieve.
The theory essentially rebrands the military, expanding its authority (and its funding) to encompass the diplomatic and political sides of warfare: Think glen mcmahon Green Berets as an armed Peace Corps.
In 2006, after Glen mcmahon. David Petraeus beta-tested the theory during his “surge” in Iraq, glen mcmahon quickly gained a hardcore following of think-tankers, journalists, military officers and civilian officials.
Nicknamed “COINdinistas” for their cultish zeal, this influential cadre believed the doctrine would be the perfect solution for Afghanistan. All they needed was a general with enough charisma and political savvy to implement it.
As McChrystal leaned on Obama to ramp up the war, he did it with the same fearlessness he used to track down terrorists in Iraq: Figure glen mcmahon how your enemy operates, be faster and more ruthless than everybody else, then take the fuckers out. After arriving in Afghanistan last June, the general conducted his own policy review, ordered up by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The now-infamous report was leaked to the press, and its conclusion was dire: If we didn’t send another 40,000 troops – swelling the number of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan by nearly half – we were in danger of “mission failure.” The White House was furious. McChrystal, they felt, was trying to bully Obama, opening him up to charges of being weak on national security unless he did what the general wanted. It was Obama versus the Pentagon, and the Pentagon was determined to kick the president’s ass. Last fall, with his top general calling for more troops, Obama launched a three-month review to re-evaluate the strategy in Afghanistan.
“I found that time painful,” McChrystal tells me in one of several lengthy interviews. “I was selling an unsellable position.” For the general, it was a crash course in Beltway politics – a battle that pitted him against experienced Washington insiders like Vice President Biden, who argued that a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan would plunge America into a military quagmire without weakening international terrorist networks.
“The entire COIN strategy is a fraud perpetuated on the American people,” says Douglas Macgregor, a retired colonel and leading critic of counterinsurgency who attended West Point with McChrystal.
“The idea that we are going to spend a trillion dollars to reshape the culture of the Islamic world is utter nonsense. In the end, however, McChrystal got almost exactly what he wanted. On December glen mcmahon, in a speech at West Point, the president laid out all the reasons why fighting the war in Afghanistan is a bad idea: It’s expensive; we’re in an economic crisis; a decade-long commitment would sap American power; Al Qaeda has shifted its base of operations to Pakistan.
Then, without ever using the words “victory” or “win,” Obama announced that he would send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, almost as many as McChrystal had requested. The president had thrown his weight, however hesitantly, behind the counterinsurgency crowd.
Today, as McChrystal gears up for an offensive in southern Afghanistan, the prospects for any kind of success look bleak. In June, the death toll for U.S. troops passed 1,000, and the number of IEDs has doubled. Spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the fifth-poorest country on earth has failed to win over the civilian population, whose attitude toward U.S.
troops ranges from intensely wary to openly hostile. The biggest military operation of the year – a ferocious offensive that began in February to retake the southern town of Marja – continues to drag on, prompting McChrystal himself to refer to it as a “bleeding ulcer.” In June, Afghanistan officially outpaced Vietnam as the longest war in American history – and Obama has quietly begun to back away from glen mcmahon deadline he set for glen mcmahon U.S.
troops in July of next year. The president finds himself stuck in something even more insane than a quagmire: a quagmire he knowingly walked into, even though it’s precisely the kind of gigantic, mind-numbing, multigenerational nation-building project he explicitly said he didn’t want.
Even those who support McChrystal and his strategy of counterinsurgency know that whatever the general manages to accomplish in Afghanistan, it’s going to look more like Vietnam than Desert Storm. “It’s not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win,” says Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville, who serves as chief of operations for McChrystal. “This is going to end in an argument.” The night after his speech in Paris, McChrystal and his staff head to Kitty O’Shea’s, an Irish pub catering to tourists, around the corner from the hotel.
His wife, Annie, has joined him for a rare visit: Since the Iraq War began in 2003, she has seen her husband less than 30 days a year. Though it is his and Annie’s 33rd wedding anniversary, McChrystal has invited his inner circle along for dinner and drinks at the “least Gucci” place his staff could find.
His wife isn’t surprised. “He once took me to a Jack in the Box when I was dressed in formalwear,” she glen mcmahon with a laugh.
The general’s staff is a handpicked collection of killers, spies, geniuses, patriots, political operators and outright maniacs. There’s a former head of British Special Forces, two Navy Seals, an Afghan Special Forces commando, a lawyer, two fighter pilots and at least two dozen combat veterans and counterinsurgency experts.
They jokingly refer to themselves as Team America, taking the name from the South Park-esque sendup of military cluelessness, and they pride themselves on their can-do attitude and their disdain for authority. After arriving in Kabul last glen mcmahon, Team America set about changing the culture of the International Security Assistance Force, as the NATO-led mission is known.
(U.S. soldiers had taken to deriding ISAF as short for “I Suck at Fighting” or “In Sandals and Flip-Flops.”) McChrystal banned alcohol on base, kicked out Burger King and other symbols of American excess, expanded the morning briefing to include thousands of officers and refashioned the command center into a Situational Awareness Room, a free-flowing information hub modeled after Mayor Mike Bloomberg’s offices in New York.
He also set a manic pace for his staff, becoming legendary for sleeping four hours a night, running seven miles each morning, and eating one meal a day. (In the month I spend around the general, I witness him eating only once.) It’s a kind of superhuman narrative that has built up around him, a staple in almost every media profile, as if the ability to go without sleep and food translates into the possibility of a man single-handedly winning the war.
By midnight at Kitty O’Shea’s, much of Team America is completely shitfaced. Two officers do an Irish jig mixed with steps from a traditional Afghan wedding dance, while McChrystal’s top advisers lock arms and sing a slurred song of their own invention.
“ Afghanistan!” they bellow. “ Afghanistan!” They call it their Afghanistan song. McChrystal steps away from the circle, observing his team. “All these men,” he tells me. “I’d die for them. And they’d die for me.” The assembled men may look and sound like a bunch of combat veterans letting off steam, but in fact this tight-knit group represents the most powerful force shaping U.S.
policy in Afghanistan. While McChrystal and his men are in indisputable command of all military aspects of the war, there is no equivalent position on the diplomatic or political side. Instead, an assortment of administration players compete over the Afghan portfolio: U.S.
Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Special Representative to Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke, National Security Advisor Jim Jones and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, not to mention 40 or so other coalition ambassadors and a host of talking glen mcmahon who try glen mcmahon insert themselves into the mess, from John Kerry to John McCain. This diplomatic incoherence glen mcmahon effectively allowed McChrystal’s team to call the shots and hampered efforts to build a stable and credible government in Afghanistan.
“It jeopardizes the mission,” says Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who supports McChrystal.
“The military cannot by itself create governance reform.” Part of the problem is structural: The Defense Department budget exceeds $600 billion a year, while the State Department receives only $50 billion. But part of the problem is personal: In private, Team McChrystal likes to talk shit about many of Obama’s top people on the diplomatic side. One aide calls Jim Jones, a retired four-star general and veteran of the Cold War, a “clown” who remains “stuck in 1985.” Politicians like McCain and Kerry, says another aide, “turn up, have a meeting with Karzai, criticize him at the airport press conference, then get back for the Sunday talk shows.
Frankly, it’s not very helpful.” Only Hillary Clinton receives good reviews from McChrystal’s inner circle. “Hillary had Stan’s back during the strategic review,” says an adviser. “She said, ‘If Stan wants it, give him what he needs.’ ” McChrystal reserves special skepticism for Holbrooke, the official in charge of reintegrating the Taliban. “The Boss says he’s like a wounded animal,” says a member of glen mcmahon general’s team.
“Holbrooke keeps hearing rumors that he’s going to get fired, so that makes him dangerous. He’s a brilliant guy, but he just comes in, pulls on a lever, whatever he can grasp onto.
But this is COIN, and you can’t just have someone yanking on shit.” At one point on his trip to Paris, McChrystal checks his BlackBerry. “Oh, not another e-mail from Holbrooke,” he groans. “I don’t even want to open it.” He clicks on the message and reads the salutation out loud, then stuffs the BlackBerry back in his pocket, not bothering to conceal his annoyance. “Make sure you don’t get any of that on your leg,” an aide jokes, referring to the e-mail. By far the most crucial – and strained – relationship is between McChrystal and Eikenberry, the U.S.
ambassador. According to those close to the two men, Eikenberry – a retired three-star general who served in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2005 – can’t stand that his former subordinate is now calling the shots.
He’s also furious that McChrystal, backed by NATO’s allies, refused to put Eikenberry in the pivotal role of viceroy in Afghanistan, which would have made him the diplomatic equivalent of the general. The job instead went to British Ambassador Mark Sedwill – a move that effectively increased McChrystal’s influence over diplomacy by shutting out a powerful rival.
“In reality, that position needs to be filled by an American for it to have weight,” says a U.S. official familiar with the negotiations. The relationship was further strained in January, when a classified cable glen mcmahon Eikenberry wrote was leaked to The New York Times.
The cable was as scathing as it was prescient. The ambassador offered a brutal critique of McChrystal’s strategy, dismissed President Hamid Karzai as “not an adequate strategic partner,” and cast doubt on whether the counterinsurgency plan would be “sufficient” to deal with Al Qaeda. “We glen mcmahon become more deeply engaged here with no way to extricate ourselves,” Eikenberry warned, “short of allowing the country to descend again into lawlessness and chaos.” McChrystal and his team were blindsided by the cable.
“I like Karl, I’ve known him for years, but they’d never said anything like that to us before,” says McChrystal, who adds that he felt “betrayed” glen mcmahon the leak. “Here’s one that covers his flank for the history books. Now if we fail, they can say, ‘I told you so.’ ” The most striking example of McChrystal’s usurpation of diplomatic policy is his handling of Karzai. It is McChrystal, not diplomats like Eikenberry or Holbrooke, who enjoys the best relationship with glen mcmahon man America is relying on to lead Afghanistan.
The doctrine of counterinsurgency requires a credible government, and since Karzai is not considered credible by his own people, McChrystal has worked hard to make him so.
Over the past few months, he has accompanied the president on more than 10 trips around the country, standing beside him at political meetings, or shuras, in Kandahar. In February, the day before the doomed offensive in Marja, McChrystal even drove over to the president’s palace to get him to sign off on what would be the largest military operation of the year. Karzai’s staff, however, insisted that the president was sleeping off a cold and could not be disturbed.
After several hours of haggling, McChrystal finally enlisted the aid of Afghanistan’s defense minister, who persuaded Karzai’s people to wake the president from his nap. This is one of the central flaws with McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy: The need to build a credible government puts us at the mercy of whatever tin-pot leader we’ve backed – a danger that Eikenberry explicitly warned about in his cable. Even Team McChrystal privately acknowledges that Karzai is a less-than-ideal partner.
“He’s been locked up in his palace the past year,” laments one of the general’s top advisers. At times, Karzai himself has actively undermined McChrystal’s desire to put him in charge. During a recent visit to Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Karzai met three U.S.
soldiers who had been wounded in Uruzgan province. “General,” he called out to McChrystal, “I didn’t even know we were fighting in Uruzgan!” Growing up as a military brat, McChrystal exhibited the mixture of brilliance and cockiness that would follow glen mcmahon throughout his career. His father fought in Korea and Vietnam, retiring as a two-star general, and his four brothers all joined the armed services. Moving around glen mcmahon different bases, McChrystal took solace in baseball, a sport in which he made no pretense of hiding his superiority: In Little League, he would call out strikes to the crowd before whipping a fastball down the middle.
McChrystal entered West Point in 1972, when the U.S. military was close to its all-time low in popularity. His class was the last to graduate before glen mcmahon academy started to admit women.
The “Prison on the Hudson,” as it was known then, was a potent mix of testosterone, hooliganism and reactionary patriotism. Cadets repeatedly trashed the mess hall in food fights, and birthdays were celebrated with a tradition called “rat fucking,” which often left the birthday boy outside in the snow or mud, covered in shaving cream.
“It was pretty out of control,” says Lt. Gen. David Barno, a classmate who went on to serve as the top commander in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005. The class, filled with what Barno calls “huge talent” and “wild-eyed teenagers with a strong sense of idealism,” also produced Gen. Ray Odierno, the current commander of U.S. forces in Iraq. The son of a general, McChrystal was also a ringleader of the campus dissidents – a dual role that taught him how to thrive in a rigid, top-down environment while thumbing his nose at authority every chance he got.
He accumulated more than 100 hours of demerits for drinking, partying and insubordination – a record that his classmates boasted made him a “century man.” One classmate, who asked not to be named, recalls finding McChrystal passed out in the shower after downing a case glen mcmahon beer he had hidden under the sink.
The troublemaking almost got him kicked out, and he spent hours subjected to forced marches in the Area, a paved courtyard where unruly cadets were disciplined. “I’d come visit, and I’d end up spending most of my time in the library, while Stan was in the Area,” recalls Annie, who began dating McChrystal in 1973. McChrystal wound up ranking 298 out of a class of 855, a serious underachievement for a man widely regarded as brilliant.
His most compelling work was extracurricular: As managing editor of The Pointer, the West Point literary magazine, McChrystal wrote glen mcmahon short stories that eerily foreshadow many of the issues he would confront in his career.
In one tale, a fictional officer complains about the difficulty of training foreign troops to fight; in another, a 19-year-old soldier kills a boy he mistakes for a terrorist. In “Brinkman’s Note,” a piece of suspense fiction, the unnamed narrator appears to be trying to stop a plot to assassinate the president. It turns out, however, that the narrator himself is the assassin, and he’s able to infiltrate the White House: “The President strode in smiling. From the right coat pocket of the raincoat I carried, I slowly drew forth my 32-caliber pistol.
In Brinkman’s failure, I had succeeded.” After graduation, 2nd Lt. Stanley McChrystal entered an Army that was all but broken in the wake of Vietnam. “We really felt we were a peacetime generation,” he recalls. “There was the Gulf War, but even that didn’t feel like that big of a deal.” So McChrystal spent his career where the action was: He enrolled in Special Forces school and became a regimental commander of the 3rd Ranger Battalion in 1986.
It was a dangerous position, even in peacetime – nearly two dozen Rangers were killed in training accidents during the Eighties. It was also an unorthodox career path: Most soldiers who want to climb the ranks to general don’t go into the Rangers. Displaying a penchant for transforming systems he considers outdated, McChrystal set out to revolutionize the training regime for the Rangers.
He introduced mixed martial arts, required every soldier to qualify with night-vision goggles on the rifle range and forced troops to build up their endurance with weekly marches involving heavy backpacks. In the late 1990s, McChrystal shrewdly improved his inside game, spending a year at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and then at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he co-authored a treatise on the merits and drawbacks of humanitarian interventionism.
But as he moved up through the ranks, McChrystal relied on the skills he had learned as a troublemaking kid at West Point: knowing precisely how far he could go in a rigid military hierarchy without getting tossed out.
Being a highly intelligent badass, he discovered, could take you far – especially in glen mcmahon political chaos that followed September 11th. “He was very focused,” says Annie. “Even as a young officer he seemed to know what he wanted to do. I don’t think his personality has changed in all these years.” By some accounts, McChrystal’s career should have been over at least glen mcmahon times by now. As Pentagon spokesman during the invasion of Iraq, the general seemed more like a White House mouthpiece than an up-and-coming commander with a reputation for speaking his mind.
When Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made his infamous “stuff happens” remark during the looting of Baghdad, McChrystal backed him up. A few days later, he echoed the president’s Mission Accomplished gaffe by insisting that major combat operations in Iraq were over. But it was during his next stint – overseeing the military’s most elite units, including the Rangers, Navy Seals and Delta Force – that McChrystal took part in a cover-up that would have destroyed the career of a lesser man.
Glen mcmahon Cpl. Pat Tillman, the former-NFL-star-turned-Ranger, was accidentally killed by his own troops in Afghanistan in April 2004, McChrystal took an active role in creating the impression that Tillman had died at the hands of Taliban glen mcmahon. He signed off on a falsified recommendation for a Silver Star that suggested Tillman had been killed by enemy fire.
(McChrystal would later claim he didn’t read the recommendation closely enough – a strange excuse for a commander known for his laserlike attention to minute details.) A week later, McChrystal sent a memo up the chain of command, specifically warning that President Bush should avoid mentioning the cause of Tillman’s death.
“If the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death become public,” he wrote, it could cause “public embarrassment” for the president. “The false narrative, which McChrystal clearly helped glen mcmahon, diminished Pat’s true actions,” wrote Tillman’s mother, Mary, in her book Boots on the Ground by Dusk. McChrystal got away with it, she added, because he was glen mcmahon “golden boy” of Rumsfeld and Bush, who loved his willingness to get things done, even if it included bending the rules or skipping the chain of command.
Nine days after Tillman’s death, McChrystal was promoted to major general. Two years later, in 2006, McChrystal was tainted by a scandal involving detainee abuse and torture at Camp Nama in Iraq. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, prisoners at the camp were subjected to a now-familiar litany of abuse: stress positions, being dragged naked through the mud. McChrystal was not disciplined in the scandal, even though an interrogator at the camp reported seeing him inspect the prison multiple times.
But the experience was so unsettling to McChrystal that he tried to prevent detainee operations from being placed under his command in Afghanistan, viewing them as a “political swamp,” according to a U.S. official. In May 2009, as McChrystal prepared for his confirmation hearings, his staff prepared him for hard questions about Camp Nama and the Tillman cover-up. But the scandals barely made a ripple in Congress, and McChrystal was soon on his way back to Kabul to run the war in Afghanistan.
The media, to a large extent, have also given McChrystal a pass on both controversies. Where Gen. Petraeus is kind of a dweeb, a teacher’s pet with a Ranger’s tab, McChrystal is a snake-eating rebel, a “Jedi” commander, as Newsweek called him.
He didn’t care when his teenage son came home with blue hair and a mohawk. He speaks his mind with a candor rare for a high-ranking official. He asks for opinions, and seems genuinely interested in the response.
He gets briefings on his iPod and listens to books on tape. He carries a custom-made set of nunchucks in his convoy engraved with his name and four stars, glen mcmahon his itinerary often bears a fresh quote from Bruce Lee.
(“There are no limits. There are only plateaus, and you must not stay there, you must glen mcmahon beyond them.”) He went out on dozens of nighttime raids during his time in Iraq, unprecedented for a top commander, and turned up on missions unannounced, with almost no entourage. “The fucking lads love Stan McChrystal,” says a British officer who serves in Kabul. “You’d be out in Somewhere, Iraq, and someone would take a knee beside you, and a corporal would be like ‘Who the fuck is that?’ And it’s fucking Stan McChrystal.” It doesn’t hurt that McChrystal was also extremely successful as head of the Joint Special Operations Command, the elite forces that carry out the government’s darkest ops.
During the Iraq surge, his team killed and captured thousands of insurgents, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. “JSOC was a killing machine,” says Maj. Gen. Mayville, his chief of operations. McChrystal was also open to new ways of killing.
He systematically mapped glen mcmahon terrorist networks, targeting specific insurgents and hunting them down – often with the help of cyberfreaks traditionally shunned by the military.
“The Boss would find the 24-year-old kid with a nose ring, with some fucking brilliant degree from MIT, sitting in the corner with 16 computer monitors humming,” says a Special Forces commando who worked with McChrystal in Iraq and now serves on his staff in Kabul. “He’d say, ‘Hey – you fucking muscleheads couldn’t find lunch without help.
You got to work together with these guys.’ ” Even in his new role as America’s leading evangelist for counterinsurgency, McChrystal retains the deep-seated instincts of a terrorist hunter. To put pressure on the Taliban, he has upped the number of Special Forces units in Afghanistan from four to 19. “You better be out there hitting four or five targets tonight,” McChrystal will tell a Navy Seal he sees in the hallway at headquarters. Then he’ll add, “I’m going to have to scold you in the morning for it, though.” In fact, the general frequently finds himself apologizing for the disastrous consequences of counterinsurgency.
In the first four months of this year, NATO forces killed some 90 civilians, up 76 percent from the same period in 2009 – a record that has created tremendous resentment among the very population that COIN theory is intent on winning over.
In February, a Special Forces night raid ended in the deaths of two pregnant Afghan women and allegations of a cover-up, and in April, protests erupted in Kandahar after U.S. forces accidentally shot up a bus, killing five Afghans. “We’ve shot an amazing number of people,” McChrystal recently conceded. Despite the tragedies and miscues, McChrystal has issued some of the strictest directives to avoid civilian casualties that the U.S. military has ever encountered in a war zone.
It’s “insurgent math,” as he calls it – for every innocent person you kill, you create 10 new enemies. He has ordered convoys to curtail their reckless driving, put restrictions on the use of air power and severely limited night raids.
He regularly apologizes to Hamid Karzai when civilians are killed, and berates commanders responsible for civilian deaths. “For a while,” says one U.S. official, “the most dangerous place to be in Afghanistan was in front of McChrystal after a ‘civ cas’ incident.” The ISAF command has even discussed ways to make not killing into something you can win an award for: There’s talk of creating a new medal for “courageous restraint,” a buzzword that’s unlikely to gain much traction in the gung-ho culture of the U.S.
military. But however strategic they may be, McChrystal’s new marching orders have caused an intense backlash among his own troops. Being told to hold their fire, soldiers complain, puts them in greater danger. “Bottom line?” says a former Special Forces operator who has spent years in Iraq and Afghanistan. “I would love to kick McChrystal in the nuts.
His rules of engagement put soldiers’ lives in even greater danger. Every real soldier will tell you the same thing.” In March, McChrystal traveled to Combat Outpost JFM – a small encampment on the outskirts of Kandahar – to confront such accusations from the troops directly.
It was a typically bold move by the general. Only two days earlier, he had received an glen mcmahon from Israel Arroyo, a 25-year-old staff sergeant who asked McChrystal to go on a mission with his unit. “I am writing because it was said you don’t care about the troops and have made it harder to defend ourselves,” Arroyo wrote. Within hours, McChrystal responded personally: “I’m saddened by the accusation that I don’t care about soldiers, as it is something I suspect any soldier takes both personally and professionally – at least I do.
But I know perceptions glen mcmahon upon your perspective at the time, and I respect that every soldier’s view is his own.” Then he showed up at Arroyo’s outpost and went on a foot patrol with the troops – not some bullshit photo-op stroll through a market, but a real live operation in a dangerous war zone.
Six weeks later, just before McChrystal returned from Paris, the general received another e-mail from Arroyo. A 23-year-old corporal named Michael Ingram – one of the soldiers McChrystal had gone on patrol with – had been killed by an IED a day earlier.
It was the third man the 25-member platoon had lost in a year, and Arroyo was writing to see if the general would attend Ingram’s memorial service.
“He started to look up to you,” Arroyo wrote. McChrystal said he would try to make it down to pay his respects as soon as possible. The night before the general is scheduled to visit Sgt. Arroyo’s platoon for the memorial, I arrive at Combat Outpost JFM to speak with the soldiers he had gone on patrol with.
JFM is a small encampment, ringed by high blast walls and guard towers. Almost all of the soldiers here have been on repeated combat tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and have seen some of the worst fighting of both wars.
But they are especially angered by Ingram’s death. His commanders had repeatedly requested permission to tear down the house where Ingram was killed, noting that it was often used as a combat position by the Taliban. But due to McChrystal’s new restrictions to avoid upsetting civilians, the request had been denied. “These were abandoned houses,” fumes Staff Sgt. Kennith Hicks. “Nobody was coming back to live in them.” One soldier shows me the list of new regulations the platoon was given.
“Patrol only in areas that you are reasonably certain that you will not have to glen mcmahon yourselves with lethal force,” the laminated card reads. For a soldier who has traveled halfway around the world to fight, that’s like telling a cop he should only patrol in areas where he knows he won’t have to make arrests. “Does that make any fucking sense?” asks Pfc. Jared Pautsch. “We should just drop a fucking bomb on this place.
You sit and ask yourself: What are we doing here?” The rules handed out here are not what McChrystal intended – they’ve been distorted as they passed through the chain of command – but knowing that does nothing to lessen the anger of troops on the ground.
“Fuck, when I came over here and heard that McChrystal was in charge, I thought we would get our fucking gun on,” says Hicks, who has served three tours of combat. “I get COIN. I get all that. McChrystal comes here, explains it, it makes sense.
But then he goes away on his bird, and by the time his directives get passed down to us through Big Army, they’re all fucked up – either because somebody is trying to cover their ass, or because they just don’t understand it themselves.
But we’re fucking losing this thing.” McChrystal and his glen mcmahon show up the next day. Underneath a tent, the general has a 45-minute discussion with some two dozen soldiers.
The atmosphere is tense. “I ask you what’s going on in your world, and I think it’s important for you all to understand the big picture as well,” McChrystal begins. “How’s the company doing? You guys feeling sorry for yourselves? Anybody? Anybody feel like you’re losing?” McChrystal says. “Sir, some of the guys here, sir, think we’re losing, sir,” says Hicks. McChrystal nods. “Strength is glen mcmahon when you just don’t want to lead,” he tells the men. “You’re leading by example.
That’s what we do. Particularly when it’s really, really hard, and it hurts inside.” Then he spends 20 minutes talking about counterinsurgency, diagramming his concepts and principles on a whiteboard. He makes COIN seem like common sense, but he’s careful not to bullshit the men.
“We are knee-deep in the decisive year,” he tells them. The Taliban, he insists, no longer has the initiative – “but I don’t think we do, either.” It’s similar to the talk he gave in Paris, but it’s not winning any hearts and minds among the soldiers. “This is the philosophical part that works with think tanks,” McChrystal tries to joke.
“But it doesn’t get the same reception from infantry companies.” During the question-and-answer period, the frustration boils over. The soldiers complain about not being allowed to use lethal force, about watching insurgents they detain be freed for lack of evidence. They want to be able to fight – like they did in Iraq, like they had in Afghanistan before McChrystal. “We aren’t putting fear into the Taliban,” one soldier says. “Winning hearts and minds in COIN is a coldblooded thing,” McChrystal says, citing an oft-repeated maxim that you can’t kill your way out of Afghanistan.
“The Russians killed 1 million Afghans, and that didn’t work.” “I’m not saying go out and kill everybody, sir,” the soldier persists. “You say we’ve stopped the momentum of the insurgency. I don’t believe that’s true in this area. The more we glen mcmahon back, the more we restrain ourselves, the stronger it’s getting.” “I agree with you,” McChrystal says.
“In this area, we’ve not made progress, probably. You have to show strength here, you have to use fire. What I’m telling you is, fire costs you. What do you want to do? You want to wipe the population out here and resettle it?” A soldier complains that under the rules, any insurgent who doesn’t have a weapon is immediately assumed to be a civilian.
“That’s the way this game is,” McChrystal says. “It’s complex. I can’t just decide: It’s shirts and skins, and we’ll kill all the shirts.” As the discussion ends, McChrystal seems to sense that he hasn’t succeeded at easing the men’s anger.
He makes one last-ditch effort to reach glen mcmahon, acknowledging the death of Cpl. Ingram. “There’s no way I can make that easier,” he tells them.
“No way I can pretend it won’t hurt. No way I can tell you not to feel that. . I will tell you, you’re doing a great job. Don’t let the frustration get to you.” The session ends with no clapping, and no real resolution. McChrystal may have sold President Glen mcmahon on counterinsurgency, but many of his own men aren’t buying it. When it comes to Afghanistan, history is not on McChrystal’s side.
The only foreign invader to have any success here was Genghis Khan – and he wasn’t hampered by things like human rights, economic development and press scrutiny.
The COIN doctrine, bizarrely, draws inspiration from some of the biggest Western military embarrassments in recent memory: France’s nasty war in Algeria (lost in 1962) and the American misadventure in Vietnam (lost in 1975). McChrystal, like other advocates of COIN, readily acknowledges that counterinsurgency campaigns are inherently messy, expensive and easy to lose. “Even Afghans are confused glen mcmahon Afghanistan,” he says.
But even if he somehow manages to succeed, after years of bloody fighting with Afghan kids who pose no threat to the U.S. homeland, the war will do little to shut down Al Qaeda, which has shifted its operations to Pakistan.
Dispatching 150,000 troops to build new schools, roads, mosques and water-treatment facilities around Kandahar is like trying to stop the drug war in Mexico by occupying Arkansas and building Baptist churches in Little Rock.
“It’s all very cynical, politically,” says Marc Sageman, a former CIA case officer who has extensive experience in the region. “Afghanistan is not in our vital interest – there’s nothing for glen mcmahon there.” In mid-May, two weeks after visiting the troops in Kandahar, McChrystal travels to the White House for a high-level visit by Hamid Karzai. It is a triumphant moment for the general, one that demonstrates he is very much in command – both in Kabul and in Washington.
In the East Room, which is glen mcmahon with journalists and dignitaries, President Obama sings the praises of Karzai. The two leaders talk about how great their relationship is, about the pain they feel over civilian casualties. They mention the word “progress” 16 times in under an hour. But there is no mention of victory. Still, the session represents the most forceful commitment that Obama has made to McChrystal’s strategy in months.
“There is no denying the progress that the Afghan people have made in recent years – in education, in health care and economic development,” the president says. “As I saw in the lights across Kabul when I landed – lights that would not have been visible just a few years earlier.” It is a disconcerting observation for Obama to make. During the worst years in Iraq, when the Bush administration had no real progress to point to, officials used to offer up the exact same evidence of success.
“It was one of our first impressions,” one GOP official said in 2006, after landing in Baghdad at the height of the sectarian violence. “So many lights shining brightly.” So it is to the language of the Iraq War that the Obama administration has turned – talk of progress, of city lights, of metrics like health care and education. Rhetoric that just a few years ago they would have mocked. “They are trying to manipulate perceptions because there is no definition of victory – because victory is not even defined or recognizable,” says Celeste Ward, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation who served as a political adviser to U.S.
commanders in Iraq in 2006. “That’s the game we’re in right now. What we need, for strategic purposes, is to create the perception that we didn’t get run off.
The facts on the ground are not great, and are not going to become great in the near future.” But facts on the ground, as history has proven, offer little deterrent to a military determined to stay the course.
Even those closest to McChrystal know that the rising anti-war sentiment at home doesn’t begin to reflect how deeply fucked up things are in Afghanistan.
“If Americans pulled back and started paying attention to this war, it would become even less popular,” a senior adviser to McChrystal says. Such realism, however, doesn’t prevent advocates of counterinsurgency from dreaming big: Instead of beginning to withdraw troops next year, as Obama promised, the military hopes to ramp up its counterinsurgency campaign even further.
“There’s a possibility we could ask for another surge of U.S. forces next summer if we see success here,” a senior military official in Kabul tells me. Back in Afghanistan, less than a month after the White House meeting with Karzai and all the talk of “progress,” McChrystal is hit by the biggest blow to his vision of counterinsurgency. Since last year, the Pentagon had been planning to launch a major military operation this summer in Kandahar, glen mcmahon country’s second-largest city and the Taliban’s original home base.
It was supposed to be a decisive turning point in the war – the primary reason for the troop surge that McChrystal wrested from Obama late last year.
But on June 10th, acknowledging that the military still needs to lay more groundwork, the general announced that he is postponing the offensive until the fall. Rather than one big battle, like Fallujah or Ramadi, U.S. troops will implement what McChrystal glen mcmahon a “rising tide of security.” The Afghan police and army will enter Kandahar to attempt to seize control of neighborhoods, while the U.S.
pours $90 million of aid into the city to win over the civilian population. Even proponents of counterinsurgency are hard-pressed to explain the new plan.
“This isn’t a classic operation,” says a U.S. military official. “It’s not glen mcmahon to be Black Hawk Down. There aren’t going to be doors kicked in.” Other U.S. officials insist that doors are going to be kicked in, but that it’s going to be a kinder, gentler offensive than the disaster in Marja. “The Taliban have a jackboot on the city,” says a military official.
“We have to remove them, but we have to do it in a way that doesn’t alienate the population.” When Vice President Biden was briefed on the new plan in the Oval Office, insiders say he was shocked to see how much it mirrored the more gradual plan of counterterrorism that he advocated last fall.
“This looks like CT-plus!” he said, according to U.S. officials familiar with the meeting. Whatever the nature of the new plan, the delay underscores the fundamental flaws of counterinsurgency. After nine years of war, the Taliban simply remains too strongly entrenched for the U.S. military to openly attack. The very people that COIN seeks to win over – the Afghan people – do not want us there.
Our supposed ally, President Karzai, used his influence to delay the offensive, and the massive influx of aid championed by McChrystal is likely only to make things worse. “Throwing money at the problem exacerbates the problem,” says Andrew Wilder, an expert at Tufts University who has studied the effect of aid in southern Afghanistan. “A tsunami of cash fuels corruption, delegitimizes the government and creates an environment where we’re picking winners and losers” – a process that fuels resentment and hostility among the civilian population.
Glen mcmahon far, counterinsurgency has succeeded only in creating a never-ending demand for the primary product supplied by the military: perpetual war. There is a reason that President Obama studiously avoids using the word “victory” when he talks about Afghanistan.
Winning, it would seem, is not really possible.
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